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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103G).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Rahofy has identified eight issues in her "Statement of Issues" for this Court to
consider during this appeal. As framed, the questions inaccurately characterize the proper
questions before this Court on appeal. As more fully set forth in the Argument section of this
brief, the correct questions presented for review are:
1.

Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion when it ruled that

Defendants appropriately sought to obtain Plaintiffs medical and employment records?
2.

Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in ordering Plaintiff to sign

releases authorizing Defendant to obtain medical and employment records, when the majority
of Plaintiff s health care providers and employers are beyond the jurisdiction of Utah courts?
3.

Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in providing a procedure (in

camera review) whereby Plaintiffs claim of continuing privilege and/or relevancy could be
independently examined and evaluated?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for factual determinations by a trial court in an order granting
a motion to compel discovery is abuse of discretion. Askew v. Hardman. 918 P.2d 469,472
(Utah 1996).

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This lawsuit arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 7, 2005
in Cedar City, Utah. R. 4. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of the state
of Illinois. R. 4.
Although Plaintiff claims significant personal injury and financial damages from the
accident, Plaintiff has refused to sign authorizations which would allow Defendants to obtain
copies of the medical/employment records for services prior to the date of the accident, out
of the state of Utah. R. 70-72.
The trial Court issued its order compelling Plaintiff to sign authorizations to obtain
employment records. R. 174-176.
The trial Court also ordered Plaintiff to provide a complete and detailed list of each
medical provider who had rendered treatment to Plaintiff (before and after the accident) and
to sign authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain those records. However, if Plaintiff
claimed that certain, specific medical records were not relevant to the claims asserted by
Plaintiff (or were protected by a privilege), the trial Court provided a process whereby she
could identify the specific medical records to which she claimed privilege or relevancy
objection. If, after appropriately identifying such records and setting forth the basis for the
objection, Defendants still wanted to obtain the records, Plaintiff would submit the records
to the trial Court for in camera review and the trial Court would determine if the records
would be produced to Defendants. R. 174-176.
Plaintiff appeals the Court's order on Defendants' Motion to Compel.
vii

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures which disclosed that
Plaintiff was then living in Fredericksburg, Virginia, identified witnesses to the claims of
Plaintiff, and identified physicians who had treated Plaintiff following the accident
(including physicians in Utah and California). The Initial Disclosures disclosed medical bills
which Plaintiff claims were incurred as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. R.
25-28. The Initial Disclosures referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" performed
by Stuart W. King, MD. (claiming a 20% whole person impairment rating) and an
"Evaluation of Economic Losses" prepared by Dr. Paul H. Randle (claiming economic losses
of $724,000). R. 26-27.
On or about January 24, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff, seeking information regarding Plaintiffs employment
history and prior medical history. R. 34-37.
On or about May 3, 2008 Plaintiff filed her discovery responses. R. 38-39. In her
response, Plaintiff listed 25 places of employment - 17 of these employers had employed
Plaintiff since 2001. Plaintiff did not provide the address of the employers. All of the
employers were outside of the state of Utah. R. 105 - 106.
Plaintiff identified five health care providers who had rendered treatment to Plaintiff
prior to the subject accident. R. 104. These health care providers are located in Illinois and
Virginia. R. 104. The responses to the Interrogatories identified a "primary care physician"
("for the past 25 years"), a chiropractor (who provided chiropractic care in 1994 for sports
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related injury to Plaintiffs back), and three health care providers who purportedly rendered
gynecological and obstetric care to Plaintiff. R. 104.
On May 8, 2008, Defendants requested the addresses of Plaintiff s employers and
requested Plaintiff to execute authorizations (since the individuals and/or entities are not
within the State of Utah and are not subject to subpoena power of Utah courts) for the release
of medical and employment records. R. 71.
On May 14, 2008, Plaintiff responded that she declined to sign the authorizations for
release of employment and medical records. R. 72.
On May 21,2008, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed authorizations for
release of employment and medical records. R. 72.
Due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the employment/medical records
authorizations, on August 13, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel asking the trial
court to order Plaintiff to sign the releases. R. 66-68.
On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was
scheduled by the trial Court. R. 152. At the time set for the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff and
Defendant advised the trial Court that a possible compromise may have been reached
whereby either the trial court or a third party, (who was to be agreed upon by counsel) would
determine which medical records and employment records are relevant to the case and
subject to production to Defendant. The parameters to determine relevance would be
determined by counsel. However, since the possible compromise was still contingent on the
reaching agreement on specific issues, the trial Court ordered if a settlement could not be

ix

reached on the Motion to Compel, counsel could request a hearing on the Motion to Compel
or could submit the Motion to Compel for decision. R. 158.
Subsequent to the December 8, 2008 hearing, the parties were unable to reach a
stipulation regarding the execution of the authorizations and the production of the
employment/medical records. The trial Court scheduled oral argument on Defendants'
Motion to Compel. R. 169.
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Compel was held on May 22, 2009. R. 171.
After reviewing the memoranda on the Motion to Compel and hearing oral argument from
counsel for both parties, the Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered:
1.

Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return
the signed authorizations to the Defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009.
Defendant was specifically authorized to access any employment records with
regards to plaintiff. R. 174

2.

Plaintiff was ordered to provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of
every medical service which Plaintiff had received - including the date,
medical provider, medical problem presented and medical service provided.
Plaintiff was also ordered to designate which medical records plaintiff
believed were not relevant to the case and, therefore, subject to privacy. R.
175.

3.

Defendant was authorized to receive the medical records for those records for
which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R.
175

4.

If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation,
Defendant would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the health care
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by
filing an appropriate motion with the trial Court. R. 175.

x

5.

In the event Defendant filed the motion with the court seeking the medical
records, Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which
continuing privacy privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the
trial court for in camera review. The trial court would then make a
determination as to whether or not the records would be disclosed to
Defendant. R. 175.

On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion to Stay Order. R. 178. Plaintiff
also filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On August 7, 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile

accident (hereinafter the "Accident") in Cedar City, Utah. R. 3 - 8.
2.

At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of Illinois, and not a

resident of the state of Utah. R. 4.
3.

According to Plaintiffs settlement demand, when the accident occurred,

Plaintiff was on her way to California to start a new job. R. 115.
4.

On October 4,2007, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, claiming personal

injuries as a result of the Accident. R. 3 - 8.
5.

Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries "including, but not limited to, injury to

her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and injury to her
upper and lower back and neck." Emphasis added. R. 6.
6.

Plaintiff alleges that she has "suffered great pain, emotional distress, loss of

enjoyment of life", and claims she has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability
with a whole body disability rating of 20%." R. 6 - 7.

1

7.

Plaintiff claims that she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is

unable to work at the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up. She claims that
her neck pain interferes with her yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended
periods of time. She claims she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up
heavy objects. She claims she has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades
which pain interferes with her yoga. She claims that she is unable to do push-ups. She
alleges severe panic attacks and mood swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level she
was accustomed to prior to the accident. R. 102.
8.

Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost

wages, future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7.
9.

On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures, wherein Plaintiff

referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" dated April 4, 2007 by Stuart W. King,
M.D. in which Dr. King:
•

Referred to her past medical history, including "several sport related injuries"
and "occasional back pain and some chiropractic treatment in the past before
the accident;"

•

Reviewed her work in the past as "a professional dog walker;"

•

Opines that she will "require chronic pain management for the rest of her
life;" and
Assigned a whole person "impairment rating" to Plaintiff of 20%.
R. 25-28.

10. In the Initial Disclosures, Plaintiff referred to an Evaluation of Economic Losses
submitted simultaneously herewith, from Dr. Paul H. Randle, wherein Dr. Randle:
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•

Estimated the "present value of the economic losses created as a result of
Sabrina's injuries, not including statutory pre-judgment interest, is $724,016."

•

Refers to her "normal capacity to earn" as being equal to $17,060 per year;
and

•

Makes other assumptions regarding her claimed lost wages and lost earning
capacity.
R. 25-28.

11.

On January 26, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for

Production of Documents to Plaintiff, seeking (among other information) the identity of all
health care providers who had rendered medical treatment to Plaintiff within twenty years
of the accident. R. 34-37.
12. Defendant served Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to
Plaintiff, seeking the identify of all employers which had employed Plaintiff within ten years
of the accident. R. 34 - 37.
13.

On May 2, 2008, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's First Set of

Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents. R. 38, 39.
14.

In response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 14 (requesting "the name and

address of each medical provider...who has examined or treated [Plaintiff] during the past
20 years [and]...the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment, and
the results of such treatment or examinations"), Plaintiff identified:
Dr. D. Dettore, 6827 Stanley Ave, Berwyn, IL 60402. Primary physician for
the past 25 years. Plaintiff generally experienced the cold and chronic ear
aches;
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Dr. Cecil Brown in Brookfield, IL. Chiropractic care in 1994 for sports
related injury to Plaintiffs back;
Planned Parenthood, 1000 E. Washington, Springfield, IL 62703.
Gynecological care from 1999 to 2001;
Women's Health Care Center, 3435 N. Sheffield, Chicago, IL, 60657.
Gynecological care from 2002 to 2007;
Woodbridge Health Center, 8580 Cinder Bed Road, Woodbridge, VA 22191.
Obstetric care during pregnancy." R. 104.
15.

In response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 15 (requesting the name and

address of each of Plaintiff s employers for the past 20 years, the hire and termination date
for each employer, the nature of her duties performed, the name and address of each
supervisor, her pay rate, and the reasons for termination), Plaintiff identified 25 employers;
17 of which had employed Plaintiff since 2001. R. 104 - 105.
16.

On May 8, 2008, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel containing

authorizations for Plaintiffs medical and employment records. Defense counsel asked
Plaintiffs counsel to have Plaintiff sign the authorizations and return them to defense
counsel (since the health care providers and employers are not within the State of Utah and
not subject to Utah subpoena). R. 110 - 111.
17.

Plaintiff did not provide any signed releases for her medical or employment

records as requested by Defendants. R. 113.
18.

On May 14,2008, Plaintiff specifically declined to sign the authorizations for

release of employment and medical records. R. 72.
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19.

In a May 21, 2008, letter, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed

authorizations for release of the records of the entities identified. R. 80-82.
20.

On August 15, 2008, due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the

authorizations, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel, requesting the trial court to order
Plaintiff to sign the authorizations. R. 66-68.
21.

On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was

scheduled by the trial court. R. 152. At that time, counsel for both parties presented a
possible agreement to the trial Court whereby the parties would agree that, either the trial
court or a third party (who was to be agreed upon by counsel) would review the
medical/employment records to determine which records are relevant to the case. The
parameters to determine relevance would be stipulated to by counsel. The parties also
indicated that, if an agreement could not be reached on the various issues regarding the
records, counsel could submit the Motion to Compel for a decision by the trial court or
request a hearing. R. 158.
22.

After the December 8, 2008 hearing, the parties were unable to reach an

agreement regarding execution of the authorizations and production of the identified
employment/medical records. The court scheduled oral argument on Defendants' Motion to
Compel on May 22, 2009. R. 169, 170.
23.

After considering the memoranda from the parties on Defendants' Motion to

Compel and after oral argument, the trial court, Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered:
•

Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return
the signed authorizations to the Defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009.
5

Defendant was authorized to access any employment records with regards to
plaintiff. R. 174
Plaintiff was ordered to provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of
every medical service Plaintiff had received - including the date, medical
provider, medical problem presented and medical service provided. Plaintiff
was also ordered to designate which medical records plaintiff believed were
not relevant to the case and, therefore, subject to privacy. R. 175.
Defendant was authorized to receive the medical records for those records for
which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R.
175
If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation,
Defendant would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the health care
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by
filing an appropriate motion with the trial Court. R. 175.
In the event Defendant filed the motion with the court seeking the records,
Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which continuing
privacy privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the trial court for
in camera review. The trial court would then make a determination as to
whether or not the records would be disclosed to Defendant.
R. 174, 175.
24.

Rather than comply with the trial court's Order, Plaintiff filed a Petition for

Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , allows a party to obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. The documents sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the
subject matter of Plaintiff s claims against Defendant.
6

By filing this personal injury lawsuit, and by asserting the claims she has, Plaintiff has
placed m issue her health and employment status prior to the accident. The documents
sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims which are in issue.
Rule 506(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, establishes that no privilege exists against the
disclosure of information communicated in confidence for the purpose of diagnosing or
treating a patient when the communication is relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element
of any claim or defense. The information sought (employment/medical records pertaining
to Plaintiffs employment and health status) is an element to the issues raised in Plaintiffs
pleadings.
The trial Court has broad discretionary authority to oversee discovery disputes in civil
matters. The trial Court in this matter fulfilled its appropriate, discretionary function when
it ordered Plaintiff to sign authorizations to allow Defendant to obtain her employment
records from out-of-state former employers.
The trial Court, in the exercise of its discretionary authority, appropriately ordered
Plaintiff to disclose the identity of her prior health care providers, to provide a complete list
of the medical services rendered to Plaintiff, to execute releases to allow Defendant to
directly obtain her medical records from out-of-state health care providers and, if a
continuing privacy privilege (or relevancy defense) claim was asserted, to identify such
specific records and to submit those records to the trial Court for in camera review.
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ARGUMENT
I.
RULE 26(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALLOWS A PARTY TO
OBTAIN DISCOVERY REGARDING ANY MATTER, NOT PRIVILEGED,
WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
INVOLVED IN THE PENDING ACTION.
Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Modern rules of civil procedure are designed to facilitate fair trials with full disclosure
of all relevant testimony and evidence. Roundv v. Staley. 1999 UT App 229, % 8, 984 P.2d
404, (Utah App. 1999), certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. Discovery rules are intended to
make discovery procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any useless
ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities and to remove elements of surprise or trickery. Ellis
v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). Rules with respect to discovery must be applied
with common sense and within reasonable bounds, consistent with its objective. State ex.
rel. Road Commission v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1966).
An attorney has a responsibility to use available discovery procedures to diligent
represent his/her client and, in civil matters, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide the means
to do this. Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89,1f30, 16 P.3d 540.
8

In this case, Plaintiff has filed her personal injury lawsuit claiming injury "including,
but not limited to" injury to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg,
right foot, and injury to her upper and lower back and neck." Emphasis added. R. 6. She
alleges she has sustained "suffered great pain, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life"
and has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability with a whole body disability rating
of 20%." R. 6 - 7.

She claims that she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, is

unable to work at the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up, that her neck
pain interferes with her yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended periods
of time, she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up heavy objects, that she
has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades which pain interferes with her
yoga, she is unable to do push-ups, and she experiences severe panic attacks and mood
swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level she was accustomed to prior to the accident.
R. 102. Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages,
future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7.
Faced with the claims asserted by Plaintiff, Defendants have sought to gather (among
other things) the medical and employment records pertaining to Plaintiffs health and
employment status prior to the accident. Plaintiff claims that her health was adversely
affected by the accident and that she now has injury which did not exist before the accident.
She claims she is unable to enjoy life as she did before the subject accident. She claims that
her moods, her ability to deal with stress, her ability to function and her overall well-being
is different that it was before the accident.
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Rule 26(b)(1) allows a defendant to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."
The term "relevant evidence" is defined in the Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence as:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Trial courts are given the duty of primarily dealing with parties and the discovery
process "first-hand." Hales v. Oldrovd, 2000 UT App 76, % 15, 999 P.2d 588. Indeed,
preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence "shall be determined by the court." See, Rule
104, Utah Rules of Evidence. Consequently, trial courts have wide latitude in making
evidentiary determinations of relevance, probativeness, and prejudice. Diversified Holdings
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, K 38, 63 P.3d 686.
The standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is very low. Even evidence
with the slightest probative value is relevant. See, for example, State v. Smedley, 2003 UT
App. 7 9 , ! 15, 67 P.3d 1005; and State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8, «J 27, 994 P.2d 177. See also,
Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402.
Employment Records
In the hearing held before Judge Westfall on May 22, 2009, exercising its judicial
role, the trial Court ruled:
First of all, with regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why
the plaintiff - - why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever the
defendant wants to spend the time looking for. They may very well be wasting
their time, but it's their time they're wasting.
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So, within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is required to execute a release
that so the defendant can access any employment records that they want to
access with regard to the plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when
she was - - Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old. You're right, it
may never come before the jury, but I don't know that until I see it. So that - you're required to that within 30 days, execute that release. They can access
any healthcare - - or excuse me, any employment records they want.
R. 233, p 12.
The trial Court determined that, at least for purposes of discovery, the Defendants
should be able to access Plaintiffs employment records. Plaintiff was ordered to execute
releases and authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain those documents.
The trial Court did not rule that the documents would necessarily be available to be
used at trial ["It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible
at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Rule 26(b)(1)]. Rather, the trial Court properly ruled that Defendants
should be entitled to receive and review the records because of the claims which had been
placed in issue. Issues regarding her employment (length of employment, rates of pay, hours
worked, duties required, duties performed, ability to perform as required, reasons for leaving,
etc.) would certainly be relevant to the claims Plaintiff now asserts in her personal injury
lawsuit, where she seeks damages for lost wages, future lost wages, and loss of future
earning capacity.
Medical Records
With regard to the medical records, the Court took a different approach. Although
recognizing the liberal discovery provisions of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ,
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("parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action,") the trial Court expressed concern that some
records may be "subject to plaintiffs privacy right1 and not disclosed." R. 233, pp. 12 - 13.
During discovery, the trial Court issued its ruling that:
I fully agree with the plaintiffs position that there may be records that are
irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't know that until I see them.
The defendant doesn't know what additional information they want - - may
want to find, what additional discovery they might want to engage in until we
find out what's there.
The trial Court continued:
I realize that the plaintiffs position is that all of this information should be
filtered through the plaintiff, and I just disagree with that. I - - the plaintiff is
not the appropriate - - plaintiffs Counsel is not the appropriate party to filter
whether or not - - to provide the filtering process to determine whether
evidence is or is not relevant. That's simply not the plaintiffs Counsel's
prerogative.
R. 233, p. 16.
The issue the trial Court appropriately recognized was, in determining relevancy, is
a Plaintiff entitled to unilaterally determine what records are "relevant" and what records are
protected by "relevancy" or "privacy concerns." The trial Court's position is consistent with
Utah law.
In her brief, as she did in oral argument, Plaintiff continues to assert that she, rather
than Defense counsel - or the trial Court - should determine, without independent review,
which records are relevant to the issues she places in issue and which are not:

1

A discussion concerning the privilege which pertains to medical records will
be considered hereinafter.
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".. . where the vast majority of those records are not related to the condition
at issue. . ." Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 1, Plaintiffs brief
P. i
•

". . . Plaintiff has already accurately and completely answered Defendants'
formal discovery requests and supplied the information deemed relevant to
such requests." Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 2, Appellant's
brief, p. L

•

". . . when the vast majority of the medical records are not relevant."
Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 3, Plaintiff's brief, p. 1.

•

"The medical records now requested by Defendant are not related to the
conditions at issue in this case." Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 14
"The medical records requested by the Defendants are not related to the
condition at issue. . . Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 14.

•

"The records are not 'related to the condition at issue/ and indeed are so
unrelated that pursuit of the records is not even 'reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence'. . ." Emphasis added. Plaintiffs
brief p. 17.

•

"The Plaintiff as the privilege holder, holds the right to determine what
information is relevant and thus what information must be disclosed ."
Emphasis added. Plaintiff s brief p. 21.
"Where the Plaintiff has determined
that certain sensitive medical
information is not relevant to the formal discovery requests made by the
Defendant... the Plaintiffs decision on the disclosure is final." Emphasis
added. Plaintiff's brief p. 22.
"The entire personnel file for all twenty-five (25) employers requested is not
necessary for the proof of the case. If the employment records are relevant,
they are [only] relevant as to Plaintiffs prior income and positions."
Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 26.

•

"The personnel files are not necessary" Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief
p. 26.

Plaintiff misstates Utah law.
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A determination of whether evidence is relevant requires a balancing of factors and
appellate courts will reverse a trial court's determination only if a trial court abuses its
discretion. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 889
P.2d 445, 454 (Utah App. 1994); and State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure discuss how claims of privilege (or claims that
evidence is otherwise subject to protection) are to be handled - and who is to make the
determination regarding the production of such documents. Rule 26(b)(6) states:
Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to
protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim
expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or
things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
Contrary to Plaintiffs position (i.e., that Plaintiff unilaterally makes the determination
as to what evidence is privileged, relevant, and subject to production or appropriately
withheld), the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly and specifically require that information
be produced "in a manner that.. . will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection." Rule 26(b)(6).
This is precisely what the trial Court ordered in this case. The Court ordered that the
medical records to which Plaintiff did not claim privilege, be presented to Defendant. If
Plaintiff claimed privilege - or relevancy concerns - she was required to specifically provide
sufficient information to allow others to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
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She was ordered to provide a list of the specific records to which the privilege was claimed
and a basis for the claimed privilege.
If, after reviewing the information, Defendant continued to believe the privilege did
not exist and that a claim for protection from production was inappropriate, the documents
would be submitted to the trial Court for in camera review to determine if the documents
would, in fact, be privileged, irrelevant and or subject to production.
Rather than provide appropriate explanation - other than the records are medical
records and Plaintiff deems them irrelevant - Plaintiff refused to disclose the records2.
Plaintiff relies on Sorenson v. Barbuto. 2008 UT 8,177 P.3d 614, for support that the
medical records need not be provided. However, Sorenson clearly directs that Plaintiff is not
in control of what records are to be produced to Defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, \ 24 stated:
Such information may be still be obtained through traditional forms of formal
discovery. Our holding should not be construed as putting the patient in
control of what medical information is made available to opposing counsel and
what is kept private. Making this information available through formal
methods of discovery strikes a balance between enabling the patient to protect
confidential medical information that has no relevance to the civil action and
providing the patient's adversary access to information that is relevant to a
condition placed at issue in the case.
2

Plaintiff did indicate that the health care providers were a chiropractor (for
sports injuries related to injury to Plaintiffs back), a primary physician (who she had seen
over a 25 yearperiod), Planned Parenthood (for gynecological care), Women's Health Center
(for gynecological care), and Woodbridge Health Center (for obstetric care). It should be
pointed out that, even for Planned Parenthood, Women's Health Center, and Woodbridge
Health Center, such records often contain significant information material to the claims
asserted in a personal injury lawsuit. For example, generally women are asked to fill out a
medical history, disclose medication which is being consumed, disclose complaints, disclose
injuries, disclose on-going health issues and otherwise establish a base-line medical history.
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The trial Court's order precisely complies with the procedural requirements of Rule
26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the reasoning of Sorenson. The effect of the trial
Court's order is to identify the requested documents in such a manner so as to allow
Defendant to assess whether the privilege or protection would arguably apply. If there was
still a dispute, the trial Court agreed to conduct in camera inspection of the
requested/withheld records. Consistent with Rule 26, "other parties" (including the trial
Court) are empowered to independently assess the applicability of the claim of privilege or
protection, rather than simply rely on the information Plaintiff chooses to disclose. The
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly support the procedure outlined by the trial Court.
Plaintiff cites State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, 1J30,972 P.2d 79, and State ex. rel. T.W.v
State, 2006 UT App 259, U f 14-16,139 P.3d 312, for the proposition that, before documents
are provided, Defendants must show with "reasonable certainty" that evidence favorable to
their defenses exist - even before in camera review is allowed.
It is important to note that both the Cardall and State ex. rel. T.W. v. State cases, supra
were criminal matters, where the medical records sought were those of the victims of sexual
crimes. In Cardall, the defendant sought to obtain a victim's psychological records. The
Cardall court held in order for Defendant to obtain these records, it must be shown with
"reasonable certainty" the records contain evidence favorable to the defense. At ^ 28-30.
Likewise, State, ex. rel. T.W. v. State involved charges of unlawful sexual activity
with a minor. The defendant in that case sought counseling records of the minor victim. The
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court held the defendant did not present evidence sufficient to meet the "reasonable
certainty" test. At ^ 14-16.
In Cardall and State ex.rel. T.W.v. State the medical records being sought were of
victims of crimes. Neither victim had brought suit, seeking damages, for the alleged wrongs.
That is, neither victim had voluntarily placed their medical condition in issue. Rather, the
State of Utah was prosecuting the alleged perpetrator of the crime, who wanted to review the
medical records of the victims and place their medical condition in issue. These cases are
significantly different from the personal injury lawsuit where a plaintiff places her own
medical history in issue.
Plaintiff also cites Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, Tf 26, 999 P.2d 582, for the
proposition that the "reasonable certainty" test should be required to determine if an

in

camera review of Plaintiffs medical records should be conducted to assess whether a
privilege exists. However, theDebry case involved a divorce action (not a claim for personal
injuries) in which the mental health of Mrs. Debry was put at issue by her husband. Mrs.
Debry had not placed her mental condition in issue. She had not voluntarily waived her
privilege by seeking damages for an alleged impairment to her medical health.
Further, Debry, similar to the Sorenson case, dealt with a doctor who discussed his
patient's confidential information and treatment with the opposing party in a lawsuit
involving the patient. Debry actually stands for the proposition that when a patient's mental
state is at issue in a lawsuit, the treating provider must at least notify the patient before
discussing confidential patient information. As the Debry court stated:
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The record before us does not demonstrate that any safeguards were used to
protect Debry's confidentiality. From all that appears, Dr. Goates voluntarily
furnished an affidavit about his patient's mental condition to her adversary in
divorce litigation. Dr. Goates gave his affidavit without a court order, without
a subpoena, and without even notifying Debry. She had no opportunity to
assert her privilege.
Debry at If 27.
The Debry court further held:
Before disclosing confidential patient records, or communications in a
subsequent litigation, a physician or therapist should notify the patient. Even
if the communications may fall into this exception to the privilege [referring
to the exception which occurs when a patient's mental health or physical health
is put at issue in a lawsuit], the patient has the right to be notified of the
potential disclosure of confidential records. Such notice assures that the
patient can pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid
unnecessary disclosure.
Debry at % 28.
In the present case, Plaintiff has been given notice of Defendants' intent to obtain her
medical records. In fact, it is Plaintiff who must sign the record releases to authorize
disclosure of the records to Defendant. Further, the trial Court has already instituted
safeguards in this case to avoid inappropriate disclosure - including, if required,//? camera.
It should be noted that the proposed authorizations submitted to Plaintiff do not allow
(and Defendants have never suggested) Plaintiffs health care providers to unilaterally
discuss Plaintiffs complaints with Defendants. The authorizations simply allow "release [of]
any and all protected health information records(s) concerning me as set forth in this
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Authorization." R. 128. The authorizations do not provide Defendants with the right of ex
parte communication beyond simply obtaining the records directly from the provider.
If, after obtaining the medical records, additional information is required, it would be
anticipated that further, formal discovery would be conducted - such as the scheduling of a
deposition or other action - of which Plaintiff would be given notice and to which Plaintiff
could, if appropriate, object. The trial Court would then have opportunity to determine if the
further inquiry is appropriate.
The documents sought here (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims
and defenses asserted in this lawsuit. The documents are subject to production pursuant to
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Against the claim of privilege or other protection,
the trial Court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in providing a mechanism
whereby the rights of Plaintiff and Defendant would be protected.
IL
BY FILING THIS PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUIT,
AND BY ASSERTING THE CLAIMS SHE HAS,
PLAINTIFF HAS PLACED IN ISSUE HER HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT
STATUS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT.
By filing this personal injury lawsuit, and by asserting the claims she has, Plaintiff has
placed in issue her health and employment status prior to the accident. The documents
sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims which are in issue.
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Employment Records
Plaintiff is claiming more than $724,000 in economic losses alleged as a result of the
subject accident. Clearly, her prior earning history is relevant (and has been placed in issue)
by asserting such claims.
Plaintiff disclosed 25 prior employers; 17 since 2001 including:
•

Bar in Macomb, IL, 2001, cocktail server, Minimum wage plus tips;
Methade, 2001, switchboard operator, Macomb, IL, $7 per hour;

•

Texas Roadhouse, Decature, IL, 2002, waitress, minimum plus tips;
Stanley Plant, 2002, accounts receivable clerk $10 per hour;

•

Hooters Restaurant, Springfield, IL, 2003 to 2004, minimum rate plus
tips;

•

Family Video, Springfield, IL, 2004, retail associate, $11 per hour;
Olive Garden Restaurant, Springfield, IL, 2005 waitress, minimum
wage plus tips;
Olive Garden Restaurant, Downers Grove and Naperville, IL, 2005 to
2006, minimum plus tips;

•

Dog walker, Chicago, IL, 2006, $10 per hour;
Louisee's Tratorria, Studio City, CA, 2006, server, minimum plus tips;
Real Estate assistant, Honolulu, HI, 2006 $10 per hour;

•

Olive Garden Restaurant, Naperville, IL., 2007, waitress, minimum
plus tips;

•

Chicago Dog Duty, 2007, dog walker, $14 per hour;
Rainforest Cafe, Gurnee, IL., 2007, waitress, minimum plus tips;
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Sears, Fredericksburg, VA, 2008, cashier, $8 per hour; and
Currently at GEICO Insurance, Fredericksburg, VA, Claims Adjuster,
$14 per hour.
R. 105 - 106.
Obviously, from just reviewing the limited information provided, it is impossible to
know the duties required by the job, the length of time employed at each employer, the
number of hours worked, whether Plaintiff took time off work for health issues, the physical
requirements of the job, the review of Plaintiff s performance, the income generated, and
other job-related issues. Defendant has sought to gather the records from the employers to
consider and review the information. Many of the jobs performed following the accident
appear to be similar to those jobs which were performed prior to the accident. Certainly
information maybe contained in the records which would help Defendants determine if there
has been a change in Plaintiffs ability to perform her employment functions, as alleged.
Receipt and review of the employment records is essential to Defendants' defense of
Plaintiffs claims.
Plaintiff has refused to execute any authorizations to obtain the requested information.
Plaintiff has claimed $724,000 in economic damages - but is unwilling to allow Defendant
to gather the information required to defend the claims.
Plaintiff has placed her employment/work history in issue by presenting the claims she
has. Obviously to defend these claims, it is important to gather the records to support and/or
refute the claims asserted.
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Medical Records
The issue of prior personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff, the issue of her prior health
(generally), the issue of medications she would have been on, the issue of her ability to do
(or not do) certain tasks, the issue of limitations (if any) in her ability to pursue her activities
of daily living, her prior chiropractic treatment, the issue of prior injuries, would clearly be
relevant to the personal injury claims she is asserting from this accident. Under Rule 26(b),
contemplates that, generally, such information should be disclosed.
A number of courts have held the filing of a personal injury action waives the
physician/patient privilege as to all information concerning the plaintiffs health and medical
history relevant to the matters at issue. See, for example, Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted
Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1204 (Alaska 2009), rehearing denied, March 16, 2009.
The Ayulek Court stated:
[W]hen a plaintiffs medical privilege has been waived by the filing of suit,
'discovery should normally proceed without judicial participation . . . in a
manner demonstrating candor and common sense.'" Requiring a plaintiff to
furnish medical releases to her adversaries is one way to accomplish that
objective. Further, so doing as an alternative to requiring plaintiffs counsel
to produce medical records can result in the discovery of records of which
plaintiffs counsel is aware. It also eliminates requiring defendants to rely on
plaintiffs counsel... "as the gatekeeper for the production of medical records
that he considered relevant."
Avuluk at 1204. See alsoArons v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831,837,338,9 N.Y.3d 393,409,
850 N.Y.S.2d 345, 351, 352, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09309; and State ex. rel. McNutt v. Keet
432 S.W.2d597, 601 (Mo. 1968)(holding plaintiff in personal injury suit waived physicianpatient privilege when filing suit and since defendants denied plaintiffs alleged injuries in
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Answer to Complaint, plaintiffs health condition was a disputed issue. The court also held
that a plaintiff should not be permitted to use privilege as both a "shield and a dagger" using
the privilege to her benefit, but denying defendants access to her medical records).

In

discussing the policy reasons behind the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in a
personal injury case, the Court of Appeals of New York stated: "This waiver is called for as
a matter of basic fairness: "[A] party should not be permitted to affirmatively assert a medical
condition in seeking damages ... while simultaneously relying on the confidential physicianpatient relationship as a sword to thwart the opposition in its efforts to uncover facts critical
to disputing the party's claim" |YArons v. Jutkowitz. 880 N.E. 831, 837,838 (N.Y. Ct. App.
2007), 9 N.Y.3d 393, 850 N.Y.S.2d 345, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09309 (citing Dillenbeck v.
Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 287, 539 N.Y.S. 2d 707, 536 N.E. 2d 1126(1989)].
In Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 48-49 (Montana 2004), the Montana Supreme
Court reversed a trial court's decision to prevent the defendant from obtaining plaintiffs
mental and medical health records. The plaintiff in that case argued that because she
provided her doctors with complete copies of her disputed medical records, and her doctors
stated the records showed no causal connection between any prior injury or condition and her
current injuries, this ended the inquiry into whether the medical records should be produced.
Plaintiff also argued that defendant should be denied access to the records because defendant
did not present any expert medical opinion that plaintiffs alleged injuries were more
probably than not caused by some other factor than her claimed cause of action. In rejecting
this argument, the Henricksen court stated:
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The fallacy in this argument is that there is no way that the State [defendant]
could have provided this opinion because it was denied access to the very
records which would have enabled it to make this determination. The [trial]
court's denial of these records only allowed for one-sided view review of the
medical records by ... [plaintiffs] physicians."
Henricksen at 49; Emphasis in original.
The Henricksen court opined "[Defendant]... was prejudiced when it was denied the
right to defend itself in an informed manner. It had the right to discover evidence related to
prior physical or mental conditions possibly connected to ...[plaintiffs] current damages."

Judge Westfall correctly recognized this doctrine during the hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Compel when he observed:
I realize that Plaintiffs position is that all of this information should be filtered
through the Plaintiff, and I just disagree with that. I - - the Plaintiff is not the
appropriate - - Plaintiffs counsel is not the appropriate party to filter whether
or not - - to provide the filtering process to determine whether evidence is or
is not relevant. That's simply not the Plaintiffs counsel's prerogative.
R. 233, p. 16.
By filing her personal injury lawsuit, and claiming the injuries and damages she has,
Plaintiff has placed in issue her medical and employment histories. The trial Court's order
appropriately struck a balance between providing the records to Defendant while, at the same
time, allowing the trial Court to determine if some, specific medical records would be
protected from disclosure.
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III.
RULE 506, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, ESTABLISHES THAT
NO PRIVILEGE EXISTS AGAINST THE DISCLOSURE OF THE
HEALTH INFORMATION OF PLAINTIFF
SINCE SHE HAS PLACED HER HEALTH STATUS IN ISSUE.
Rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence, deals with Physician and mental Health TherapistPatient privileges. Generally, Rule 506(b) states:
If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's
life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1)
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental
health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient, and
(3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under
the direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians
or members of the patient's family who are present to further the interests of
the patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
However, Rule 506(d), dealing with Exceptions, clearly provides:
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the
patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim
or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense.
In this case, Plaintiff has claimed injuries "including, but not limited to, injury to her
right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot and injury to her upper
and lower back and neck." R. 6. In Answers to Interrogatory, she indicates:
Plaintiff suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is unable to work at
the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up. Neck pain
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interferes with my yoga practice and flares up when sitting for extended
periods and Plaintiff is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up
heavy objects. Pain and pinched nerves between shoulder blades interferes
with yoga and Plaintiff is unable to do pushups or pickup heavy objects.
Severe panic attacks, mood swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level
Plaintiff was accustomed to prior to the accident. See also medical
documentation provided in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures.
R.102.
Plaintiff identified that she had seen a chiropractor for "sports related injury to
Plaintiffs back" in 1994. R. 104. She disclosed other health care providers. R. 104.
Plaintiff has placed her medical condition "in issue" in this law suit. She has placed
in issue her ability to work, to sit, to run, to pick up objects, to do push ups, and has placed
in issue her mental and emotional status. She has placed in issue her physical, mental and
emotional status.
Pursuant to Rule 506(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, there is no privilege when
Plaintiffs health condition is an element of her claim and of the defense of the matter.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO
OVERSEE DISCOVERY DISPUTES IN CIVIL MATTERS
When disputes arise concerning discovery, trial courts are granted broad discretion
regarding discovery matters. Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, % 8, footnote 1, 995 P.2d
14; R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1999). The
trial court has sufficient discretion, and wide latitude, to require discovery practices that are
fair and effective in the circumstances of the pending controversy. Bennion v. Utah State Bd.
of Oil Gas &Min.. 675 P.2d 1135.1144 (Utah 19831 In determining whether "good cause"
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exists to require production of documents, the Utah Supreme Court has held "a wide latitude
of discretion is necessarily vested in the trial judge." Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
495 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1972).
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the "purpose [of Utah's discovery rules]
is to make procedure as simple and efficient as possible... and to remove elements of surprise
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as
directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible." Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 407 (Utah
App. 1999) quoting Ellis v. Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967).
As mentioned above, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empower the trial Court with
the "gate-keeping" role in discovery disputes.

The trial Court, in reviewing issues

concerning relevancy and claimed privilege, is empowered to rule on these kind of disputes.3
In fulfilling its duty in this case, the trial Court offered to conduct an in camera inspection
of the records if Plaintiff and Defendants could not agree what records would be received.
Even though Defendants claim that, by filing her lawsuit, Plaintiff placed her medical and
employment history in issue, thus waiving her claim for privilege against disclosure of health
care records, the Court agreed to conduct in camera review if necessary. Although such an
in camera review is not necessary in these type of cases (since there is no privilege),
appellate courts have recognized the propriety of such reviews in appropriate settings.

3

Defendant does not believe the trial Court should be required to review in
camera all medical records in every personal injury case. Generally, having placed her health
in issue (as discussed above), the privilege against disclosure is waived. However, if there
is a specific, unusual, reason for claimed privacy or privilege, such specific, unusual requests
may be considered by the trial Court.
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In Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 2005 UT App. 352,1f 21, 121 P.3d
74, for example, the Utah Court of Appeals, held a trial court abused its discretion by ruling
that a hospital's incident reports were protected by the "statutory care review privilege"
without conducting an in camera inspection of the records. The Cannon court cited Benson
v. IHC Hosps. Inc., 866 P.2d 537, (Utah 1993), in stating that in order to determine the
applicability of the privilege [referring to the "statutory care review privilege"], it is
"incumbent upon counsel to establish the evidentiary basis necessary for the trial court to
make its determination of the issue of privilege." (citing Benson at 538) (emphasis in
original).
The Cannon court also cited Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 801 P.2d 912, 915
(Utah 1990), in which the Utah Supreme Court was required to determine whether the
"statutory 'official confidence' privilege" protected city police department personnel and
internal affairs files from discovery. Madsen at 914. The parties inMadsen had reached a
stipulation regarding the submission of the disputed materials to the trial court for an in
camera review, but the trial court declined to make the review, ordered oral argument on the
matter, and ruled whether the files were discoverable following the oral argument. Madsen
at 914.

On interlocutory appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial

court partly because the trial court had ruled on the privilege issue solely based upon oral
argument (and without an in camera review) from the parties as to why the privilege did not
apply. See id The Cannon court further cited the Madsen court's reasoning that:
[Wjhen statutory or common law privileges are "asserted in opposition to a
request for discovery," trial courts "must make an independent determination
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of the extent to which the privilege applies to the materials sought to be
discovered," which determination "is the result of the ad hoc balancing of: (a)
the discoverant's interest in the disclosure of the materials; and (b) the
[information holder's] interests in their confidentiality."
Cannon at ^f 17.
The Cannon court further cited with approval the Madsen court's statement that "the
party claiming a common law or statutory privilege must provide the trial court a 'specific
designation and description' of each item of material for which the privilege is claimed, 'as
well as the precise and certain reasons' for preserving the confidentiality of each item.'. . .
Consequently, trial courts may properly reject a broad, non-particularized claim of the
privilege." Cannon at f 17 (internal citations omitted).
V.
THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY, APPROPRIATELY ORDERED PLAINTIFF TO DISCLOSE THE
IDENTITY OF HER PRIOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, TO SPECIFICALLY
ASSERT WHICH RECORDS (AND THE BASIS UPON WHICH) SHE CLAIMED
PRIVILEGE, AND TO SUBMIT THOSE RECORDS FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW.
In this case, Plaintiff filed her Complaint claiming injuries "including, but not limited
to, injury to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and
injury to her upper and lower back and neck." R. 6. She claims to have incurred medical
expenses "and other special, miscellaneous and incidental damages in an amount to be
proven to the Court." R. 6. She claims "great pain, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other general damages in an amount to be determined by the Court." R. 6 - 7. She
claims "permanent physical injury and disability with a whole body disability rating of 20%"
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R. 7. She claims lost wages, future lost income, and loss of future lost income, and loss of
future earning capacity. R. 7.
In attempting to gather information regarding Plaintiffs claimed injuries and
damages, Defendant requested the names and addresses of all prior health care providers
and/or employers. R. 71. Defendant served medical and employment authorizations to
PlaintiffonoraboutMay8,2008. R. 71. Plaintiff refused to sign the authorizations. R. 72.
When an impasse was reached concerning whether Defendants were entitled to gather the
medical/employment records pertaining to Plaintiffs health/employment status prior to the
accident, Defendants sought trial Court intervention to compel execution of the
authorizations and to allow Defendants to obtain the records.
The trial court used its sound discretion to grant Defendants' Motion to Compel and
to order Plaintiff to provide to the court and Defendants a list of her medical providers as
well as a summary of the dates she treated and the type of treatment rendered. However, the
trial Court allowed Plaintiff to designate some records to which she did not claim a
continuing privacy privilege, and to designate specific records to which she did claim a
continuing privacy privilege. If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege, the trial
Court ordered Plaintiff to specifically identify those records and to identify the basis for the
claim of continuing privacy privilege. If Defendants, after having received Plaintiffs
identification of claimed privileged records, determined to continue to seek the records,
Plaintiff would then be entitled to submit the records to which the claimed continuing privacy
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privilege existed to the Court for in camera review to determine if such records would be
produced, or would be protected.
Clearly, the trial Court's order is within the discretion given to the trial Court. The
trial Court has "built in" a way for Defendants to obtain the records which "are relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action," which "appear reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, the trial Court "built in" a way for Plaintiff to object to the production of specific
records, if there is a legitimate basis for the objection.
Plaintiff claims that the trial Court's order should be reviewed for "correctness" and
quotes Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 Utah 1996) for support. In fact, Askew supports
an "abuse of discretion" standard. The Utah Supreme Court, in Askew stated:
In reviewing the court of appeals decision, we must determine whether it
correctly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the
documents in Hardman's insurance claim file were prepared in anticipation of
litigation and thus were protected from discovery under rule 26(b)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State ex rel. Road Comm yn v. Petty, 17 Utah
2d 382, 387, 412, P.2d 914, 918 (1966) (trial court granted discretion to
determine whether interrogatories were subject to question under Utah's
former work-product rule); see also UtahDepV ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892
P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (trial court granted broad discretion regarding discovery
sanctions); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257,1266
(Utah 1984) (same). Although trial courts have broad discretion in matters of
discovery, the trial court, in exercising such discretion, must apply the correct
law to its findings of fact, and its findings of fact must be supported by
sufficient evidence. An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent
an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the
trial court's ruling. See, State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (while
appellate courts always decide what the law is, deference maybe given to trial
court's application of law to the facts); accord Brown v. Superior Court, 137
Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725, 729-30 (1983) (trial court discretion in discovery
matters "includes the right to decide controverted factual issues, to draw
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inferences where conflicting inferences are possible and to weigh competing
interests. It does not include the privilege of incorrect application of law or a
decision predicated upon irrational basis.") Thus, we must first determine if
the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court made an erroneous
conclusion of law.
At page 472.
Here, the trial court did not make any "erroneous conclusion of law." The trial court
established the procedure to be followed in obtaining the records - and established a "safeguard" in the event claimed privilege was asserted. However, no authorizations have been
executed and no records have been obtained. Although the trial Court ordered that all
employment record authorizations be executed, none have been. Although the trial Court
ordered that all "non-contested" medical record authorizations be executed, none have been.
Although the trial Court ordered that Plaintiff submit a list of medical record to which she
claimed continuing privilege - and the basis for such claim - none have been. The trial Court
was well within its sound discretion in ordering Plaintiff to execute the authorizations and
to supply the records as ordered.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully submit that:
The trial court exercised sound discretion when it ruled that Defendants appropriately
sought to obtain Plaintiffs medical and employment records to defend against claims seeking
personal injury and lost wages. Plaintiff waived her privilege against disclosure by filing her
personal injury lawsuit and placing in issue her health and employment status.
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The trial Court, exercising sound judgment and discretion, established a procedure
whereby concerns of continuing privilege maybe addressed; i.e., in camera review. Plaintiff
does not have the unilateral right to determine what records are "relevant" or "privileged."
Rather, in the face of the claim of privilege or relevance, the trial Court appropriately will
make the appropriate determination.
The trial Court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in ordering Plaintiff to
sign releases authorizing Defendant to obtain medical and employment records, from out-ofstate employers and health care providers.
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial Court
be affirmed. The order of the trial Court compelling Plaintiff to execute appropriate releases
and

authorizations

for

employment

and

medical

records

from

out-of-state

employers/providers is appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

O

day of April, 2010.

LpWELL V.SMITH
'RENT D. HOLGATI
Attorneys for Respondent - Lynn
Steadman and Steadman Land &
Livestock, LLC
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties:
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the
possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or
other evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on
the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully
completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or
less;
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an
administrative agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and
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(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by
counsel.
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are
subject to discovery under subpart (b).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact
discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or
rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B),
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the
party may call if the need arises;
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions
of the deposition testimony; and
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and
those which the party may offer if the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter,
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i)
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be
deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.
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(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and
served.
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more
of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests
for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the
discovery.
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action
to obtain the information sought; or
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule,
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney,
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consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts.
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided.
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule;
and
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions
from the expert.
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials.
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a
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claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A
receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified,
it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information
until the claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court
action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the
following:
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had;
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery;
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited
to certain matters;
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2),
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or
ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is
filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the
interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and
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the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision
(a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in
the following circumstances:
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a
deposition of the expert.
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise
stipulated or directed by order.
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to
discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable
information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good
faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(f)(2) The plan shall include:
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1)
were made or will be made;
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should
be limited to particular issues;
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced;
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
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rules, and what other limitations should be imposed;
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating
fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in
conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1)-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be
deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry
of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not
included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under
Rule 16(b).
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery
plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after
joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery
or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the
request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is
signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were
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pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters
arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to
the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in
Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed
with the court.
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.
Advisory Committee Notes
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JUN 1 ! 2009

Lowell V. Smith, #3006
SMITH & GLAUSER
A Professional Corporation
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801)562-5555
Attorneys for Defendants

5th DISTRICT COURT
^ C O U N TJNTY
V
. Deputy Clerk

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

:
:

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL

:

v.

:

Civil No. 070500807

LYNN STEADMAN, an individual,
and STEADMAN LAND &
LIVESTOCK, L L C ,
Defendants.

:
:
:

Judge G. Michael Westfall

This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Compel,
and having reviewed the memoranda in the matter, and having heard arguments thereon,
the Court finds and orders as follows:
ORDER
1. The Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return
the signed authorizations to the Defendants by and through their counsel of record on or
before June 22,2009. Defendants may access any employment records with regard to the
plaintiff.

000174

2.

On or before June 22, 2009, the plaintiff is to provide to the Court and to the

Defendants a complete list of every medical record the plaintiff has ever had generated on
her behalf, including the date, medical provider, medical problem presented and medical
service provided. The list provided to the Court and to the Defendants must be accurate,
or the Court may impose sanctions. Plaintiff is to designate which of the medical records
listed, plaintiff believes are not relevant to this case and therefore, subject to privacy.
3.

Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical records for those records to

which Plaintiff does not claim a privacy privilege.

Plaintiff is either to disclose those

specific records directly to Defendants, or, if the Plaintiff does not have a copy of a specific
record in her possession, Plaintiff is required to sign an authorization for release to release
those specific records.
4.

Regarding Plaintiff's designation of health care providers which Plaintiff

claims are privileged and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litigation, Defendants have
30 days after receipt of the list of health care providers which Plaintiff claims are irrelevant
and subject to privacy, to object to Plaintiff's designation by filing a motion with the Court.
5.

In the event that Defendants file a motion with the Court, Plaintiff will have

an additional 30 days to obtain all such records from the various health care providers and
submit all such records to the Court. The Court will review these records in camera, and
make a determination as to whether or not they are to be disclosed.
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DATED this / / _ day of

/ ^,
/

, 2009.

/BY THE COURT

HONORABLE G. MICHAEL WESTFAT
Fifth/dudicial District Court Judge

Approved as to form:
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

Jamis M. Gardner
Attorneys for Plaintiff

6/Z/0?
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

day of

, 2009, to:

Jamis M. Gardner
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
2500 N. University Ave.
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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-1IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SABRINA RAHOFY,
Plaintiff,
Case No

vs

070500807 PI

LYNN STEADMAN, et al,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
May 22, 2009

BEFORE

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G WESTFALL
Fifth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff

Jamis M
Gardner
SEILER & ANDERSON
ROBINSON
2500 N University Ave
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone
(801)375-1920

For the Defendant

Lowell V. Smith
SMITH & GLAQSER
7351 S Union Park Ave
#200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Telephone
(801)562-5555

Transcribed by

Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 8^606
Telephone
(801) 377-2927
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-3THE COURT:

Okay.

So what else do you want to present

roe today -- to me today?
MR. GARDNER:

Well, your Honor, we just want to

reiterate some of the facts that -- first of all, in their
objection to the request for a hearing, they represent to the
Court that our last offer -- or that our position was that we
wanted the records to be sent to us first and then we would send
them to them.

What we had thought we had agreed to at the last

hearing was that we would —

the records would be sent to your

Honor or a third party, and they would decide what was relevant,
and then they' d send those to the defendant.

So it wasn't like

we were just withholding that.
So in their objection they've either misunderstood what
we thought we had agreed to or mischaracterized that agreement.
So we just wanted to clarify that we believed the context of this
is crucial in that the case law that they have cited in Jackson
v. Kennecott, there are four factors that they must show, and
they fail the first three.
documents are relevant.
m

They have failed to show that these

They have failed to show that they are

our possession, and they've failed to show that they are

relevant to the case
We've already —

like I said, we've provided them

what -- everything we believe to be related to the collision, and
if they need to go a few years back, that's normally what we do
in these cases

What they've asked for is gynecological

records

-4fiorn when she was 19-years-old

How is that relevant to her

accident and some injury -- left wrist injuries and some back
injuries
case

That's not relevant

That's not important to this

How is it relevant that when she was 16 she worked at

McDonald's 7

Why do they need personnel files or those records to

determine whether or not as a 31-year-old she is now competent or
whatever as the -- m

the real estate profession and needs that

information to go forward
So the case that they have cited, they have failed it
I believe, your Honor, that the most important factor is that,
yoa know, this is a type of issue that has already come before a
district court, and unfortunately the judge who had it the first
time around didn't have the opportunity of prior existing case
law, and so that got appealed
We don't need to go through that process because the
Supreme Court j.n 2008 just reviewed this issue
Barbuto case -- Sorensen v

They said m

the

Barbuto, 2008, "Rule 506(d)(1) does

not mean that the patient has consented to the disclosure of his
entire medical history
the disclosure
or defense

of

Rule 506 is only broad enough to allow

information

relevant

to an element of

any

claim

Therefore, it is a limited waiver of privilege,

confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the treatment
related to the condition at issue '
So this is an issue that's already been decidea for
your Honor, and the Supreme Court has gone over it with specific

-5
reference to these type of medical requests that are beyond
what has been asked for

They didn't -- the defendants haven't

actually made that clear m
]ust -- memoranda

their memorandums because they've

They've said, "We've requested these records

they didn't give them to us "

Well, we gave them everything we

believe to be relevant, but now they want more than that
That is where that limit of waiver of privilege applies
So we believe that our client does not need to be subjected to
her medical records being reviewed by defendants simply because
she filed a lav;suit related to an accident

Why her

gynecologica

records or obstetric records, or why she -- when she had a cold
when she was nine, how that is relevant to this case
THE COURT

Okay

All right

What else do you ^ant'to

bring to my attention 9
MR

GARDNER

Just that

your Honor

an State vs.

Cardall, the last -- the last point I'd like to make, in State
v

Cardall, if they make a general request, which they've made

here, ]ust a general request for the records from these doctors,
they -- the plaintiff still holds the privilege

She gets to

make that decision wnether those are going to be released, if
they're not related to the treatment, the condition at issue
So she has made the decision, and as Counsel we've consulted on
that, and that's -- the decision is final, according to the Utah
Supreme Court in 1999

That decision is final

Now if they can -- if they -- it says, "Unless defense

Counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was
withheld and brings it to the attention of the Court, the
decision is final "

Now if they make specific requests, then the

case law suggests that we give it to the Court, the Court reviews
it in camera and then gives it to the defense

That's what we

offered, which that's -- we don't believe they're entitled to
that, because they haven't made a specific request, but we were
willing to provide that, even though it wasn't a specific
reque st
Based on what they're asking, it's a general request,
and that's the point

So the -- when they first sent us these

requests for authorization, it related to the employment records
going back to when she was 16

Tom Seller, who is with our

office, and he's been on the board of governors right now with
the UAJ, the Utah Association
Trial Lawyer's Association

for Justice

which was the Utah

When we received those he sent a

letter and said, "Can you point me to a statute or a case law
that you believe entitles you to that information, because

I've

never seen that, and I'd like to look at that and know why it is
you believe you're entitled to employment records related to a
car accioent "
You know

we've given them ta< returns

W-2's if we haven't alreadv
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-9the records that are there to determine whether they're relevant
or not
Let me just address the relevancy matter

In their

answers to irterrogatorles, they identified five healthcare
providers that were out of state

For one of those, a Dr

Brown,

they specifically referred to the fact that he treated her for
a sports related injury to plaintiff's back

In this case,

plaintiff is claiming injury to her shoulder, knee, ankle, upper
and lower back

We're clearly entitled to get these records to

determine what her condition was like before the accident, what
injuries were caused by the accident, and what the residuals have
been after
When we were here before we talked about the medical
records, and we agreed that we would not seek the McDonald's
records, nor the records when she was dog w a l k m q , but all of the
other authorizations would be executed

We would receive those

records again, to determine what her claim for lost wages is
Now it's important to note that of the 25 employers that
she identified m

her answers to interrogatories, she's had 17

employers since 2001
earning histoid

That clearly would be relevant about an

what kind of job she had, why she was employed,

why she was let go, why she changed

employment

This is a personal injury action where she has placed
her health in issue, and she's made a claim for lost wages where
she has put m

issue her earning and her earning capacity

-10Normally we would subpoena those records, but the scope
of the subpoena does not go out of the state

So typically in

these kind of cases we have the plaintiff execute releases and
authorizations, we then obtain those records
This case has been pending since -- the accident
happened August 7 th , 2005
and we have been

Suit was filed October 2 nd , 2007,

trying since we filed our answer to gather

this information so we could move this matter forward

We have

prepared the case management order, which then has fallen off
track because we've had these discover/ disputes
We would recommend to the Court that the Court issue its
order that the plaintiff execute the releases and authorizations,
that those records come to us
copy of everything we get to Mr

We' re happy to provide an exact
Seller and Mr

Gardner

If we

can't agree on how those records are going to be used at trial or
in motions or in other discovery efforts, at that point we could
involve the Court to look at the relevancy
entitled to gather the records

We're clearly

We're entitled to review them

in order the evaluate the claims
I think this is a -- and part of the reason we asked
that we not come down for a hearing was because we thought we
had resolved all these issues before, and maybe there was just
a misunderstanding as to how tne Court was going to rule

But

we're happy to be here, and I'm happy to answer any questions, if
the Court has any

-11THE COURT

Okay

MP

Thank you

SMITH

THE COURT

Thank you

It isn't your motion

motion, bat I let you speak first

You're defending the

Is there anything else you

want to bring to my attention'?
MR

GARDNER

Your Honor, if the requests had been

specified -- you know, Mr

Smith brings up the back doctor

It

was 11 years prior to the accident, but arguably I can see the
argument for why that particular record might be relevant

But

they presented all of these, 25 employers and five doctors -McDonald's included, dog walking, and gynecological

records

So it wasn't -- they didn't ask us to go through and
tell us which ones we would sign
sign these five "
authorizations

They said, "Sign these 25,

So we've had to defend against all 30 of these

for release

If they had limited it or we -- to

the back doctor or the recent real estate professional that she's
m,

maybe we can reach an agreement, but when it's all 30, and

we've already provided them the information of wages, employment,
position, they can use that information to present to the jury,
"Look, she's been employed at 17 different places since she
was —

since 2001 "

They can depose her about why sn.e wasn't

there or why she left
The personnel files from all those people are not
relevant, and there s no statute or law t h at says they're
entitled to all those personnel records when we re dealing with

-12a per -- a car accident and her future loss of earning

In all

tnese cases -- we did tax returns and w-2's, and then the experts
argue about how much she could make

So we've had to defend

against all of these because that's the request that -was made
to us -- or rather, the demand

So based on that, we've had to

defend against this
THE COURT

All right

Thank you

First of all, with

regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why the
plaintiff -- why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever
the defendant wants to spend the time looking for

They may very

well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting
So within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is
required to execute a release so

the defendant can access any

employment records that they want to access with regard to the
plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when she was -Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old

You're right, it

may never come before the jury, but 3 don't know that until I see
it

So that -- you're required to do that within 30 days,

execute that release
excuse me

They can accesb any healthcare -- or

any employment records they want
With regard to the medical care records, this is what

I m q o m g to rule

Within 30 days the plaintiff is to provide to

the Court and to the defendant a corrplete list of every meaical
record the plaintiff has ever had generated on her behalf with
the date, the doctor ard the medica, problem that was presented,

-13and the service that was provided
detail, but just that much

Yon don't have to go into any

information

Then within -- also within that 30 days, the plaintiff
is required to designate which of those records the plaintiff
believes are not relevant to the case, and therefore should be
subject to the plaintiff's privacy right and not disclosed

Any

other records not so designated are either to be disclosed, or
if the plaintiff doesn't have the copy of the record m

their

possession, and you know, they simply gather the information by
calling and talking to the healthcare provider, then they are
to -- the plaintiff is required to sign a release to release
those recoros —

those specific records

With regard to the items that are in the list that
the plaintiff claims should not be disclosed, the defendant
then has 30 days thereafter to file a motion with the Court to
review those records and decide whether or not they're relevant
Then if that motion is filed, then the plaintiff has the
responsibility to gather all of those records, and the plaintiff
has a responsibility to have those records available so that I
can review tnern
I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there
may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed,
but I don t know that until I see them

The defendant

doesn't

know vhat additional information they want -- may want to find,
what additional discovery they might want to engage I n until we

-14find out what's there
I'm going to throw the onus of the burden back on the
plaintiff with regard to those medical records, and require that
the plaintiff

gather the information, submit the information,

and then with regard to those records that they don't want to
produce, gather the records, m

the event the defendant

files a request that any of those specific

then

records be disclosed

Do both Counsel understand my order?
MR

SMITH

MR

GARDNER

I think we -- I do, your Honor
I think so, your Honor

Just for

clarification, those five medical providers, we don't have any
of their records right now

So for her to -- she's just going

to have to go from her memory and call them, like you say
she's -- I'm

So

just saying --

THE COURT

You have 30 days to provide the list of

every visit, and as I indicated

-- what was it, every visit,

the date of every visit, the medical problem
and the service that was provided,

that was presented

without going into any detail

That may very well require that she admit that she had
hemorrhoids
at

I don't

and went to a doctor for

it, but that's where we're

-- if there were disclosures made, obviously we

don't make -- we're not going to get into those disclosures at
this point
Then once you provide that
to the defendant

to go through that

list, then the burden
list and say,

NN

I want

shifts
-- I

-15believe that this record is something the Juage should looK at,"
and then they designate those records
chat

They have 30 days to do

Once those are presented to you, then -- and a motion is

filed, then you -- I'm going to give you an additional 30 days to
gather the records and provide them to the Court
look at them m

and then I will

camera and make a determination as to whether or

not they ought to be disclosed
MR

GARDNER

I ]ust wanted to confirm that, m

that 30

days, I don't think it's reasonable that we'll be able to get the
actual records, but she's going to do her best to provide them
THE COURT

Yeah, you have 90 days, essentially, to get

the records, if my math is right

You have 30 days to designate

the records -- well, and then they have 30 days to designate
which ones they want you to -- that they think that should be
pro -- they think should be produced that you don't want to
produce, and I guess they could do that m
want

five days if they

But then you have from that time -- that notice is

provided, you have an additional 30 days to gather dll of those
records and submit them to the Court
MR

GARDNER

THE COURT
MR

GARDNER

THE COURT

I ]ust mean in that f u s t 30 ddys
Right

No, I understand

It will be based on what 5he can remember
Yeah, you'll have at least 6C days to gather

whatever records need to be presented to me so

I can determine

whetner they should be presented to the -- producea to the

-16defendant
MR

SMITH

she can remember

Your Honor, I understand it's ]ust not what
She has to take some affirmative action to

contact the doctors and find out what those -THE COURT
responsibility

That's correct

That is -- it's her

Since she wants to protect that privacy

interest, and we don't know, you don't know, I don't know if
there really is a privacy interest to be protected, she has the
burden of gathering that information and providing it

If she

doesn't, then I may very well impose some sanctions, which could
be fairly serious m

this case

I realize that the p l a i n t i f f 5 position is that all
of this information should be filtered through the plaintiff,
and I lust disagree with that

I -- the plaintiff is not the

appropriate -- plaintiff's Counsel is not the appropriate party
to filter whether or not -- to provide the filtering process to
determine whether evidence is or is not relevant

That's simply

not the plaintiff's Counsel's prerogative
MR

GARDNER

I just want to -- just trying to clarify

to that first 30-day list may not be based on actual records, but
will be based on her homework that she's doing to get that list
aid calling the doctors, but I don't know that we'll be able to
get the actual records for that first 30-day list
THE COUPT

Well, and if I -- and I'm not saying

that

you have to have the actual records, but the information that you

-17provide better be accurate, because if it's not, then I may very
well impose some sanctions because 1 -~ this has been going on
long enough

I'd hoped that you'd be able to resolve it

essentially stalls the case

You know, I'd

This

like to see this

issue get resolved
Mr

Smith, can you prepare an order for my signature 9

MR

SMITH

THE COURT
enough

Thank you, your Honor
All right

I hope that I've made it clear

Let me see if there is anything
MR

SMITH

I will

else

May I suggest to the Court that we may

need to submit an amended case management order, but we'll work
together to prepare that
THE COURT

See if you can work that out

MR

Thank you very much

All right

Thanx you
SMITH

THE COURT

That's all m

that matter, and that

concludes the matters on the Court's 9 o'clock
MR

SMITH

THE COURT

Have a nice weekend
Thank you

(Hearing concluded)

calendar

your Honor
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Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient.
(a) Definitions As used in this rule
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any
state
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any
state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, advanced practice
registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that
person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addition
(b) General rule of privilege If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating
the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2)
information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental
health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or
mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis
and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient.
The person who was the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense As to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for
mental illness, if the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in
need of hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered
examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless the court in
ordering the examination specifies otherwise.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah Code Ann. §§ 7824-8(4) and 58-25a-8 There is no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of Rule 501, marriage and family therapists are not
covered by this Rule
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 and Rule 506 are as follows:
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, it being the opinion of the Committee that
full disclosure of information by a patient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be encouraged as in the
"physician" patient setting. The Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 further apply to licensed clinical social
workers To meet this request, the Committee included such individuals within the definition of psychotherapists Under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social work "means the application of an established body of knowledge and
professional skills in the practice of psychotherapy. . ." Section 58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage in the
practice of clinical social work unless that person: (1) is licensed under this chapter as a certified social worker," has the
requisite experience, and has passed an examination. Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for "clinical social
worker[s]." As a result of including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-10 in
total for all social workers.
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to civil cases. The Committee was of
the opinion that the considerations supporting the privilege apply in both.
(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, the proposed Rule 506 granted protection only
to confidential communications, but did not extend the privilege to observations made, diagnosis or treatment by the
physician/psychotherapist. The Committee was of the opinion that while the traditional protection of the privilege should
extend to confidential communications, as is the case in other traditional privileges, the interests of society in discovering
the truth during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests in extending the protection to observations made,
diagnosis or treatment. However, the Supreme Court requested that the scope of the privilege be broadened to include
information obtained by the physician or psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment, whether obtained verbally
from the patient or through the physician's or psychotherapist's observation or examination of the patient. The Court further
requested that the privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and advice. To meet these requests, the Committee relied in
part on language from the California evidentiary privileges involving physicians and psychotherapists. See Cal. Evid. Code §§
992 and 1012. These features of the rule appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The Committee also relied on language
from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503.
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Upon the death of the patient, the privilege ceases to exist.
The privilege extends to communications to the physician or psychotherapist from other persons who are acting in the
interest of the patient, such as family members or others who may be consulted for information needed to help the patient.
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or
psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker practicing under the supervision of a clinical social worker would be
included. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-6.
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the
physician or psychotherapist or others who were properly involved or others who overheard, without the knowledge of the
patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that
in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in
terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of
"waiver."
The Committee did not intend this rule to limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Committee Note to
Rule 501.
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child abuse reporting requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et
seq.
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted during the 1994 Legislative General
Session that changed the licensure requirements for certain mental health professionals. The rule now covers
communications with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis of mental or emotional
conditions, specifically certified social workers, marriage and family therapists, specially designated advanced practice
registered nurses and professional counselors.
Some mental health therapists use the term "client" rather than "patient," but for simplicity this rule uses only "patient."
The committee also combined the definition of confidential communication and the general rule section, but no particular
substantive change was intended by the reorganization.
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Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of
Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury.
Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a
witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to crossexamination as to other issues in the case
(e) Weight and credibility This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to
weight or credibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This provision is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable to Rule 8, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) Rule 104(c)
recognizes that hearings on motions to suppress confessions should be conducted out of the hearing of the jury where there
is a contested issue. State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302 (1973). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Cf. Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S. Ct. 192, 19 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1967).
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Rule 4 0 1 . Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the
former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact."
Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme
Court State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word "statute" the words
"Constitution of the United States" have been added.
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